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Revisiting Rokkan: On the Determinants of the Rise 
of Democracy in Europe 
Svante Ersson∗ 
Abstract: This article is an attempt to extend Rokkan's 
analysis of the rise of democracy in western Europe also to 
include eastem Europe. Which relevance do Rokkan's fac-
tors - economy, territory, culture - have when applied to 
both western and eastern Europe? Through the mapping of 
the development of democracy following the four thres-
holds suggested by Rokkan - legitimacy, incorporation, rep-
resentation, executive power - a crossnational analysis, 
based upon at most 28 cases, is made in order to test various 
explanatory factors. Territory and culture has an impact an 
the rise of democracy in Europe in general, but in particular 
an the passing of the First threshold of democracy, i.e. the 
legitimacy threshold. Other factors, not suggested by Rok-
kan, that are conducive to the rise of democracy are what 
kind of family systems that exists and the occurrencies of 
elite settlements. Thus, Rokkan's main ideas about the rise 
of democracy in Western Europe also holds true when ex-
tended to cover the whole of Europe. 
1. Introduction 
It is obvious that the early 1990s is a period of marked political changes. We 
now faces the (re)making of many new nation-states - look at the extension of 
membership of the United Nations. While in die 1980s only one state (Brunei) 
was accepted as a member, in the 1990s so far (as of early 1995) 28 new na-
tions has entered the ranks of the United Nations as membbes. In order to
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find a similar increase in UN-membership one must go back to the early 1960s 
and the end of colonialism in Africa. This means that state-making will be a 
feature of die 1990s. 
Another feature may be the continued transitions to democracy from various 
forms of authoritarianism among the majority of the memberstates of the UN. 
These transitions has been idenitifed as parts of long waves of democratization, 
but there has also over time been a series of reversals for democracy, to use the 
terminology of Huntington (1991: 16). It is indeed diffcult to predict the direc-
tion of present developments: are wo still in the third wave or are wo perhaps 
entering the third reversal? 
These observations indicate the relevance for our time of two subjects ex-
tensively dealt with by Stein Rokkan, viz. the nation- and state-building of the 
Western world and the formation of mass democracies in Western Europe. The 
problems that the new states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 
face when institutionalising democratic institutions may therefore not only 
beneft from the experiences learned from Mediterrannean Europe (Pridham 
1990) or Latin America (Lijphart 1990) but also from Western Europe in the 
early 20th century (Lijphart 1992). 
The aim of this paper is to map the process of democratization all over 
Europe from the 19th century down to the interwar period, thereby testing 
some of the models proposed by Rokkan for explaining the (non)introduction 
of democratic regimes in Europe. This means that the analysis is extended to 
cover eastern as well as western Europe, testing various explanatory models. 
Rokkan's models are compared with the explanatory power of competing mod-
els. It might also be necessary to add, that this is not a replication of a Rok-
kanian analysis, but rather an attempt at using a rather traditional crossnational 
design in the analysis for illuminating some of the problems that Rokkan did 
approach. 
2. Rokkan's model of political development 
Rokkan's work an the political development of Europo include a lot of articles 
and chapters. Two major contributions that 1 will rely upon here are "Nation-
building, cleavage formation and the structuring of mass politics" (Rokkan 
1970) and "Territories, nations, parties: toward a geoeconomic - geopolitical 
model for the explanatoryn of variations within Western Europe" (Rokkan 
1981). One major interpretative analysis of Rokkan's models is presented by 
Peter Flora (1981) in his "Stein Rokkans Makro-Modell der politischen 
Entwicklung Europas: ein Rekonstruktionsversuch". In addition, in recent years 
a lot of works evaluating the contribution of Rokkan has been published 
(Berntzen & Solle 1990; 1992; Immerfall 1992; Torgersen 1992; Hagtvet, 
1992). 
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The three main explicanda Rokkan refer to in relation to the development of 
democracy in Europe are: (a) the institutional development of democracies 
(Rokkan 1970: 79-91); (b) the development of the party systems (Rokkan 
1970: 112-137), and (c) the rise of fascism (Rokkan 1981: 84-93). In this paper 
the analysis will focus an the mapping of the institutionalization of four thresh-
olds necessary for introducing democracy in Europe. The four institutional 
thresholds identified by Rokkan are legitimation (recognition of political rights 
and civil liberties), incorporation (rights of universal participation in elections), 
representation (possibility of new movements to be represented in national 
parliaments) and executive power (possibility of translation of parliamentary 
strength into executive power) (Rokkan 1970: 79). These thresholds in many 
respects equal the virtues of a liberal society, the extension of universal suf-
frage, the introduction of proportional election systems, and the acceptance of a 
parliamentarian system. 
Looking to the models used to explain the rise of democracy in Europe one 
may identify three major factors: economy (E), territory (T) and culture (C). 
Depending an various historical conditions - the time of the national revolu-
tions (before 1789), or the time of the industrial revolutions (from 1800 to 1900 
roughly) - these factors may have different impacts. The economy may imply 
the timing of the capitalist breakthrough or the rapidity of economic growth; 
territory is covered by geopolitical position (location in relation to the city 
belt), extent of periphery control or the timing of the national unification (early 
or late); culture contains information an the outcome of the reformation, the 
extent of ethno-linguistic mobilization or the strains an the church-state rela-
tions (Rokkan 1981: 74-75). On the basis of these general factors, it was possi-
ble for Rokkan to specify certain conditions conducive to the democratisation 
of Europe: 
 
- the survival of an old tradition of representatioe institutions increases 
the chances of establishing a legitimate opposition (T); 
- the extent of control of the periphery had implications for the aspira-
tions of national independencies which could make rapid extension of 
suffrage possible (T); 
- a well entrenched Catholic church an the other hand slowed down the 
process of democratization (Rokkan 1970: 82-83; 1981: 84). 
The emphasis in Rokkans explanatory models is put an historical conditions 
and structural factors. There is some, but not large space where political actors 
can act and modify the outcomes of these preconditioned and intervening proc-
ess variables. One such exception is to be found in his dicussion of conditions 
favouring proportional representation (PR). Only small resistance was mobi-
lised against such a reform from the old establishment, since the PR secured 
some power-sharing for these groups in a new democratic regime (Rokkan 
1970: 88-89). 
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3. Other alternative explanatory models. 
Stein Rokkan was not alone in theorizing about the rise of European demo-
cracy. However much of what one may find in the writings of other theoreti-
cians can also be traced in Rokkan. Somewhat crudely it is possible to distin-
guish between theories emphasising either historical structure (a la Rokkan) or 
more actor-oriented factors. The structural models cover developments in a 
long-run perspective identifying long waves, while actor-oriented models deal 
wich short-run effects. Among the structural models it is appropriate to include 
Barrington Moore's thesis about the role of the upper landed classes for the rise 
of democratic rule. In particular, he stressed that "laborrepressive agrarian 
systems provide an unfavorable soil for the growth of democracy" (Moore 
1966: 435), because in these systems there were no room for the formation of 
an independent merchant-oriented agrarian class interested in building coali-
tions with the rising capitalist class, together establishing democratic institu-
tions. This idea has been further developed by John Stephens (1989) stressing 
the impact of a powerful landlord class. He writes that the "correlation between 
the strength of large landlords and the survival or breakdown of democracy in 
the interwar period ... indicates that this one factor provides a powerful expla-
nation for the survival or denüse of democracy" (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992: 
83). 
There are also structural approaches incorporating historical dimensions. 
One theme takes as a starting-point - as Rokkan - the geopolitical position, but 
tends to stress - more than Rokkan - the differences between western, central 
and eastern Europe (Szücs 1990: 13-16; Gunst 1991: 82; Anderson 1974). The 
context is the relation between the centre (western Europe) and the periphery 
(eastern Europe) where the centre dominates over the periphery in terms of 
political and economic resources, making democracy easier to establish in the 
centre (Janos 1989: 356-357). Somewhat different is the approach one can find 
in Emmanuel Todd's analyses of family structures and ideological systems 
(Todd, 1983). His thesis is that there is some empirical covariation between 
kinds of family structures in Europe formed from the time of the French revo-
lution and certain ideological patterns in Europe. He is able to distinguish four 
types of families based upon two dichotomies: freedom versus authority and 
inequality versus equality (Todd 1983: 13-18). An argument could be put for-
ward that has relevance for the development of democracy: family systems 
stressing freedom may be more open for introducing civil liberties, while sys-
tems characterized by inequality may encourage the development of a capitalist 
ethic. Thus, the family system most conducive for the emergence of democracy 
would be what has been called the “famille nuclèaire absolue” by Todd, as it 
stands for freedom and inequality. 
The structuralist theories have a strong standing in this research tradition, 
made clear by Gregory M. Luebbert in concluding his analysis of interwar 
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Europe with: "One of the cardinal lessons of the story I have told is that leader-
ship and meaningful choice played no role in the outcomes" (Luebbert 1991: 
306), i.e. liberalism, fascism or social democracy. 
So far we have dealt wich more or less typical structural explanatory mod-
els, but there are in the literature available models that explores the possibilites 
of an actor-oriented approach. Following in the steps of Moore, Brian M. 
Downing focuses an the role of military involment of the state in the early 
modern period of Europe, i.e. roughly the 17th century. His thesis is that the 
more of military involvement and the more of internal mobilising for warfare, 
the more probable that it may end in establishing a military-bureaucratic re-
gime. It would tend to eliminate the traces of an earlier representative tradition, 
and consequently increase the difficulties in introducing a democratic regime 
(Downing 1992: 239). 
It is evident that most actor-oriented theories focus an short-run develop-
ments. They also tend to look at the actors at the elfte-level stressing the 
choices the actors confront at certain critical junctions. Depending upon the 
interests of the actors the skilled politician may choose the alternative that 
increases/decreases the possibility of securing a democratic development. In 
the words of Juan Linz: "These are the actions that constitute the true dynamics 
of the political process" (Linz 1978: 4). One problem with this approach is that 
it often has to rely upon detailed case studies in order to establish the impact of 
the choices made by different actors. Attempting at solving this problem John 
Higley and Michael Burton (1989; 1992) mapped the occurrences of elfte set-
tlements in Europe and Latin America. Their argument is that as a precondition 
for establishing a secure democracy there must exist an elite settlement; they 
argue that the earlier the elfte settlement, the more favorable are the conditions 
for establishing democracy. The elfte settlement represents a true corroboration 
of the existence of a consensus culture within the political System. 
The models outlined may be looked upon as more or less compatible wich 
Rokkan's models. Still it might be relevant to evaluate which parts of Rokkan's 
models that are most conducive to an understanding of the democratic develop-
ment in the entire Europe. The models presented so far, to be tested later an 
include: 
- geopolitical location: distance to the city belt (Rokkan) 
- outcome of the reformation: strength of catholic church (Rokkan)  
- ethno-linguistic mobilization (Rokkan) 
- timing of capitalist breakthrough (Rokkan)  
- survival of representative traditions (Rokkan)  
- strength of an agrarian elite (Stephens; Moore) 
- military involvement and internal mobilization (Downing)  
- east-west dichotomy in Europe (Scüzs) 
- family structures (Todd)  
- elite-settlements (Higley and Burton). 
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4. Data and methods 
The relevance of these models will be tested against the European experience, 
the cases selected for analysis consisting of the states of Europe existing in the 
interwar period. The choice is motivated by a conscious effort to increase the 
number of cases used in an analysis like this, or what Lijphart (1971; 1975) 
calls case-stretching. This is a practice already accepted. In many studies, to 
give an example, Finland has been considered one case for the 19th century or 
the early 20th century, although a Finnish state was not established until 1917. 
This means, however, that for the states not yet formed at the turn of the cen-
tury, proxies for different variables had to be estimated. 
A number of indicators will be employed in order to take account of the 
country variation wich regard to the introduction of democratic procedures in 
Europe. In many instances these indicators are crude, but they still represent a 
meaningful structuration in distinguishing an early road from a later road to 
democracy. The same comments apply to the choice of indicators for the set of 
independent variables used in the analysis to follow. 
Most of the data consists of simple classifications of the nation-states in 
question. These classifications may take the form of dichotomies or trichoto-
mies, which, however, may be interpreted as approximations of data scaled an 
an interval-level. This also makes it possible to apply correlation and regression 
analyses to these data. It is motivated by the fact that such estimation tech-
niques in general are very robuste, even in cases when the data are scaled an 
nominal data as sometimes is the case in this analysis. It is also important to 
remember that the purpose of the use of these statistical techniques is not pri-
marily to draw any general inferences from the estimations, but to use a tech-
nique that allows for a systematic treatment of a dataset. 
One might also add, that in order to present an analysis true to the intentions 
of Rokkan and taking account of all the complexities in his argument about 
complicated causal mechanisms relevant for various cases, more of a detailed 
case approach would be needed (cf Tilly 1984: 129-143; Ragin 1987: 126-133). 
Such an enterprise, however, is not attempted at here. 
5. Mapping the development of democracy in Europe 
In order to map the development of democracy in Europe it is appropriate to 
choose the set of democratic thresholds suggested by Rokkan. An attempt is 
made to cover the passing of these thresholds for the European states discussed 
above. Let us begin with the passing of the legitimacy threshold. 
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5.1 The threshold of legitimacy 
This threshold may be identfied as the introduction of civil liberties, not only in 
a formal mode but also in a real mode. In a certain sense one may say that it 
equals the right to voice as Hirschman would phrase it (Hirschman 1970). 
There are no clearcut measures available to identify the timing of these liber-
ties, why different proxy variables will be relied upon to catch the variation in 
time and space. 
Three aspects will be considered here: the breakthrough in time of economic 
liberalism, the establishment in time of civil liberties, and the time for the for-
mation of socialist parties in Europe. These aspects are then added to form a 
rough composite measure of the breakthrough of legitimacy in Europe. Intro-
ducing economic liberalism paved the way for a step-wise establishment of 
civil liberties, while the formation of socialist parties may be looked upon as a 
test of the reality of the civil liberties implemented. 
To begin with economic liberalism, one may identify two components. On 
one hand we have the timing of a free trade legislation during the 19th century 
(up to circa 1870) and on another hand there is the degree of protectionism 
(measured as custom tariffs) employed in the period ending with the First World 
War. The earlier the introduction of free trade and the lower the tariffs used, the 
more there is of a tradition of economic liberalism. And a tradition of economic 
liberalism may indeed be considered a precondition of political liberalism. 
There are two components that catch the variation in the introduction of 
civil liberties: the first legislation on press freedom, and the first legislation 
indicatiing the freedom of associations. The earlier the introduction of these 
liberties, the stronger the tradition of liberalism is. 
The final indicator takes into account the systems acceptance of an opposi-
tional political force, the socialist parties. The earlier the forming of these par-
ties and the earlier its parliamentary representation, the more firmly rooted the 
political rights will be. These cases where no socialist parties were founded are 
here classified as latecomers, since their absence probably was a consequence 
of an underdeveloped and traditional societal setting (Albania). 
These measures an the introduction of liberal or legitimate rule in Europe 
are added and presented in Table 5.1.3 (LEG1; LEG2). Although the covaria-
tion between the measures is far from perfect, it is evident that one can identify 
a set of countries where this process took off at an earlier stage: Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. An-
other cluster of countries consists of these where this process had a late break-
through: Bulgaria, Greece, Poland, Romania, Albania, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Russia and Yugoslavia. Somewhere in between the set of the re-
maining countries belongs: Czechoslovakia, Ireland, Luexmbourg, Norway, 
Sweden, Austria, France, Italy, Hungary, Portugal and Spain. Of course, this 
classification is somewhat arbitrary, but some crude criteria are resorted to and 
the pattern that becomes visible meets with a certain intuitive common sense. 
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Table 5.1.1: 
The breakthrough of liberal reforms in Europe 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
Alb - LAT - - HIG -  - LAT 
Aus 1853 MID 18 22.8 MED 1867 1867 MID 
Bel 1849-53 EAR 9 14.2 LOW 1831 1831 EAR 
Bul - LAT - 22.8 HIG -  [1879] LAT 
Cze - MID - 22.8 MED -  - MID 
Den 1850-51 EAR 14 - MED 1849 1866 EAR 
Est - LAT - - HIG -  - LAT 
Fin - LAT - 35.0 HIG -  - LAT 
Fra 1860 MID 20 23.6 MED 1789 1870 1791 1881 EAR 
Ger 1834-50 EAR 13 16.7 MED 1848 1871 1848 MID 
Gre - LAT - - MED 1844 1864 MID 
Hun - MID 18 22.8 MED 1867 1868 MID 
Ire - EAR - - LOW -  - EAR 
Ita 1860 MID 18 24.8 MED 1848 1848 MID 
Lat - LAT - - HIG -  - LAT 
Lit - LAT - - HIG -  - LAT 
Lux - EAR - - LOW -  - MID 
Net 1845 EAR 4 - LOW 1815 1848 1848 EAR 
Nor 1850-51 EAR - - MED 1814 - EAR 
Pol - LAT - 72.5 HIG -  - LAT 
Por 1850-51 EAR - - HIG 1821 1885 LAT 
Rom - LAT - 30.3 HIG . 1866 1866 LAT 
Spa 1860 MID 41 37.0 HIG 1812 1876 1876 LAT 
Swe 1859 MID 20 27.6 MED 1812  1864 EAR 
Swi 1850-51 EAR 9 10.5 LOW 1848 1874 1874 MID 
UK 1846 EAR 0 - LOW 1776 1870 1769 1846 EAR 
Rus - LAT 38 - HIG 1861 1905 [1905] LAT 
Yug - LAT - 22.2 HIG -  1888 LAT 
 
Notes: 
(1) refers to country code available in Appendix 2 
(2) refers to approx. time for introducing free-trade legislation 
(3) approx. classification of time according to (2) 
(4) refers to approx. level of custom tariffs before 1914 
(5) the same, based an another dataset 
(6) approx. classification of size of level of tariff according to (4) and (5) 
(7) refers to approx. introduction of press freedom 
(8) refers to approx. introduction of freedom of association 
(9) approx. introduction in time of liberal reforms Those classifications made refers  
 either to time (EAR=early, MID=mid, LAT=late), or importance (HIG=high; 
 MED=medium; LOW=1ow).  
 
Sources: 
(2): Rees 1932: Kindleberger 1975; Pollard 1981: 255-7  
(4): Pollard 1981: 259 
(5): Drabek 1985: 476 
(7): Encyclopaedia Britannica 1911: 300-4; Goldstein 1983: 35  
(8): Loening 1894 
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Table 5.1.2: 
The breakthrough of socialist parties in European politics 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) (5)
Alb -  LAT - LAT
Aus 1874* 1889 EAR 1897         LAT
Bel 1879 1885* MID 1894* MID
Bul 1891 *  MID 1894* MID
Cze 1878*  EAR 1897* MID
Den 1871 *  EAR 1884* EAR
Est 1905 1917* LAT 1907* LAT
Fin 1899*  LAT 1907* LAT
Fra 1879 1905* LAT 1893* MID
Ger 1863* 1875 EAR 1867       1871 * EAR
Gre 1918*  LAT 1901 * LAT
Hun 1880 1890* MID 1905* LAT
Ire 1896 1912* LAT 1922* LAT
Ita 1892*  MID 1895* MID
Lat 1904*  LAT 1907* LAT
Lit 1895* 1896 LAT 1907* LAT
Lux 1902*  LAT 1896* MID
Net 1882 1894* MID 1888* EAR
Nor 1887*  MID 1903* LAT
Pol 1892* 1894 MID 1897* MID
Por 1875*  EAR 1911* LAT
Rom 1893*  MID 1888        1900* LAT
Spa 1879*  EAR 1910* LAT
Swe 1889*  MID 1896* MID
Swi 1880 1888* MID 1896* MID
UK 1884 1900* LAT 1900* LAT
Rus 1898*  LAT 1906* LAT
Yug 1894 1901 * LAT 1903* LAT
 
 
Notes: 
(1) refers to the country code 
(2) refers to the founding year of socialist parties  
(3) approx. classification in time according to (2) 
(4) refers to the First time representation of socialist parties in parliament 
(5) approx. classification in time according to (3) The classifications made refers to time 
(EAR=early, MID=mid, LAT=1ate) The years with a star (*) are those that conventionally 
are referred to for the socialist parties 
 
 
Sources: 
(2): Wende 1981; McHale 1983; Fricke 1976; Schumacher et al. 1986 
(4): Mackie & Rose 1982; Stemberger/Vogel 1969 
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Table 5.1.3: 
The threshold of legitimacy 
CODE LEGITIMACY I 
SCORES 
11 CODE 
LEGITIMACY
1 
SCORES
II 
Alb 10 0 Lat 10 0 
Aus 5 1 Lit 10 0 
Bel 2 2 Lux 4 1 
Bul 8 0 Net 1 2 
Cze 4 1 Nor 4 1 
Den 1 2 Pol 8 0 
Est 10 0 Por 6 1 
Fin 10 1 Rom 9 0 
Fra 5 1 Spa 7 1 
Ger 2 2 Swe 4 1 
Gre 8 0 Swi 3 2 
Hun 6 1 UK 3 2 
Ire 4 1 Rus 10 0 
Ita 5 1 Yug 10 0 
Note: 
These scores are based upon the classifications made in tables 5.1.1 and 
5.1.2; Leg 1 scores: the higher the value, the later the introduction of le-
gitimate rule; Leg 11 scores: the higher the value, the earlier the introduc-
tion of legitimate rule. 
5.2 The threshold of incorporation 
The introduction of civil liberties and political rights made it meaningful to 
form political parties. And the parties made efforts to mobilise members and 
parts of the electorate in order to secure a position within the political system. 
The crucial condition for fullfilling this was the introduction of universal suf-
frage, which equals the passeng of the threshold of incorporation. This thresh-
old may be captured by measures an the introduction of male and female (i.e. 
universal) suffrage as well as estimates of the proportion of the population 
franchised some time around 1900 (i.e. from 1900 to 1910). These indicators 
are portrayed in Table 5.2 below. The dates reported refer to the ferst time 
employment of the new rules for extended suffrage. It is noteable that there are 
marked differences for some countries between the time of the introduction of 
male respectively female suffrage. This is the case for countries like Greece, 
Switzerland and France. On the other hand, in countries like Finland, Denmark 
and Poland it was introduced at the same time. This means that an early
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Table 5.2: 
The threshold of incorporation 
CODE SUFFRAGE % FRAN- CODE SUFFRAGE % FRAN 
 FOR MEN 
WO- 
MEN 
CHISED 
IN 1900 
(AP-
PROX) 
 FOR MEN 
WO-
MEN
CHISED 
IN 1900 
(AP-
PROX) 
Alb 1921 1945 0 Lat 1917 1917 0 
Aus 1907 1919 1 Lit 1917 1917 0 
Bel 1893 1948 2 Lux 1918 1919 8 
Bul 1879 1945 2 Net 1917 1919 11 
Cze 1907 1920 1 Nor 1898 1913 20 
Den 1915 1915 1 Pol 1918 1918 5 
Est 1917 1917 0 Por 1974 1974 10 
Fin 1906 1906 4 Rom 1917 1946 1 
Fra 1848 1944 2 Spa 1869 1931 23 
Ger 1871 1919 2 Swe 1909 1921 6 
Gre 1844 1952 2 Swi 1848 1971 32 
Hun 1919 1945 6 UK 1918 1928 16 
Ire 1918 1923 1 Rus 1917 1917 0 
Ita 1919 1946 7 Yug 1920 1946 5 
Sources: 
Nohlen 1978; Hewitt 1977; Rokkan/Meyriat 1969; Rokkan 1970; Mackie/Rose 
1982; Sternberger/Vogel 1969; Derbyshire/Derbyshire 1991; Gerlich 1973; 
Hoensch 1988; Anderson/Anderson 1967; Flora 1983. 
 
 
introduction of male suffrage does not imply an early introduction of universal 
suffrage. Looking at the proportion of the population franchised at the begin-
ning of the 20th century it seems to be the case that the earlier the male suf-
frage was introduced, the larger the proportion of the population franchised. 
This means that in an early period of democratic development the timing of the 
male suffrage may the best measure on democratization. 
5.3 The threshold of representation 
According to democratic theory two preconditions for a democratic polity are 
extended civil liberties and political rights, but also the employment of an 
universal suffrage in free elections. The threshold of representation that more 
or less equals the use of proportional representation in the electoral system is 
no such precondition. In the European context, however, the introduction of PR 
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formulas has often been one component in the battle for establishing a demo-
cratic regime; there is in fact only one exception and that is, of course, the 
United Kingdom. The PR system imply that once universal suffrage is achieved 
the judgement made by the electorate at elections should be fairly or pro-
portionately translated into mandates in Parliament. 
Table 5.3 contains the timing of the introduction of the PR formulas in 
Europe. An early introduction of PR in Belgium is well-known, but one may 
note that in Serbia (or Yugoslavia) there was a PR system in use as early as 
1890. It is also remarkable that countries like Finland and Bulgaria entered this 
system at an rather early date, while it was in reality first used in France in 
1945 and in Spain as late as 1977. 
Table 5.3: 
The threshold of representation 
CODE INTRODUCTION CODE INTRODUCTION 
 OF PROPORTIONAL  OF PROPORTIONAL
 REPRESENTATION  REPRESENTATION 
Alb 1946 Lat 1920 
Aus 1918 Lit 1920 
Bel 1899 Lux 1919 
Bul 1912 Net 1917 
Cze 1920 Nor 1919 
Den 1915 Pol 1918 
Est 1920 Por 1910 
Fin 1906 Rom 1918 
Fra 1945 Spa 1977 
Ger 1919 Swe 1907 
Gre 1926 Swi 1919 
Hun 1938 UK - 
Ire 1921 Rus 1917 
Ita 1919 Yug 1890 
Sources: 
Sternberger/Vogel 1969, Rokkan/Meyriat 1969; Mackie/ Rose 1982. 
5.4 The threshold of executive power 
If one remebers the European context it is also meaningful to look upon the 
establishment of an relation between the power of Parliament and the power of 
the executive, i.e. the implementation of the parliamentary principle. The 
struggle for establishing parliamentarianism was in many European countries 
the last step in securing a democratic regime. 
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An attempt is made in Table 5.4 to map the timing of the introduction of a 
parliamentary regime. In most cases this meets with small problems, but for 
some authoritarian regimes (Portugal, Spain, Hungary) the dates chosen may be 
a matter of argument. It is also questionable whether Albania or Russia even 
today has established a parliamentary system. What is obvious from the table is 
that there are huge time spans separating the Brittish case from most other 
cases. 
Table 5.4: 
The threshold of executive power 
CODE INTRODUCTION CODE INTRODUCTION
 OF PARLIAMEN- OF PARLIAMEN
 TARY RULE TARY RULE
 
Alb - Lat 1922
Aus 1918 Lit 1922
Bel 1831 Lux 1868
Bul 1919 Net 1868
Cze 1920 Nor 1884
Den 1901 Pol 1919
Est 1920 Por 1911
Fin 1919 Rom 1923
Fra 1875 Spa 1931
Ger 1918 Swe 1917
Gre 1910 Swi 1919
Hun 1926 UK 1741
Ire 1922 Rus -
Ita 1876 Yug 1921
Sources: 
Gerlach 1973; Hewitt 1977; Nohlen 1978; Sternberger/Vogel 1969 
 
 
When summarising the development of democratic rule in Europe there are 
two aspects that will be stressed. What sequences in time do different countries 
follow when introducing the democratic regime? What is the covariation be-
tween the four thresholds selected when comparing nations? 
The ideal sequence proposed by Rokkan was legitimation, incorporation, 
representation and execution. Among the European states looked upon, most of 
them come quite close to that sequence. There are two types of deviating cases, 
an the one hand those where the parliamentary principle was introduced at an 
quite early stage (United Kingdom, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxem-
borg, the Netherlands and Norway), and an the other hand those where PR 
systems were introduced at an early stage (Portugal and Yugoslavia) or a rather 
late stage (Greece, Hungary and Spain). 
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What about the interaction between the various phases of democratic devel-
opment? Estimating some simple correlations between the variables outlined in 
Table 5.1.1 to 5.4, one may get a crude overview of what kind of relations there 
are. Surprisingly, the matrix portrayed in Table 5.5 gives the overall impression 
that these phases in general are rather weakly interrelated. An early passing of 
the legitimacy threshold does not mean that an early incorporation or represen-
tation may be expected. These phases are related in a logical way, but empiri-
cally there is an important variation in time and space. The finding is that the 
introduction and development of democratic regimes in Europe was not an 
unidimensional phenomenon. 
Table 5.5: 
Correlation matrix for the variables indicating the development of democracy 
in Europe 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1) Legitimacy 1 1.00       
(2) Legitimacy 11 -.90 1.00      
(3) Male suffrage .16 -.15 1.00     
(4) Female suffrage -.O1 .02 -.14 1.00    
(5) Approx. franchise 1900 -.35 .51 -.59 .06 1.00   
(6) Proportional .07 -.05 -.34 .05 .04 1.00  
 representation        
(7) Parliamentarianism .46 -.50 -.05 -.O1 -.08 -.45 1.00
Note: 
The correlation analyses are based upon 28 cases with the exception for 
proportional representation where N=27 (not the UK), and parliamentarian-
ism where N=26 (not Albania and Russia/USSR). 
 
6. Explaining the variation in development of democracy in 
Europe. 
What will account for the variation in the development of European democracy 
as mapped in the previous section? What is the relevance of Rokkan's models? 
Are they more able to explain the variation than other competing models? 
These are the questions to be answered here. 
lt might be fruitful to follow Rokkan's distinction between various master vari-
ables - territory, culture, economy - in this analysis, where what here will
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be called political variables are to be added. The starting-point will be the rele-
vance of territory or geopolitical location for the development of democraty in 
Europe. This aspect is covered by three variables; the first one (CPR) simply 
indicates the center-periphery distinction made by Rokkan (1981: 78); the 
second one (LORE) is based upon a classification suggested by Janos (1989: 
123), while the third (WEST) tries to capture the separation of Europe in a 
western, central and eastern part (Szücs, 1990: 16). All three variables are 
scaled so that the higher the value, the more of center or core or westwardness. 
The data for these explanatory variables are presented in Appendix 1. 
The correlation matrix in Table 6.1 gives an indication of how democratic 
development covaries with the territorial division of Europe. There is no doubt 
that there is a covariation between geopolitical position and the passing of the 
legitimacy threshold, First done in the core city-Belt of western Europe, reach-
ing die eastern part at a later stage. The same applies to the introduction of 
parliamentarianism, altough the connection looses somewhat in strength when 
cases like Albania and Russia are eliminated. The other dependent variables 
shows an expected sign, but the pattern is not uniform. Still it is a matter of fact 
that the territorial division of Europe had an impact an the pattern of demo-
cratic development. The next step in the analysis belongs to the cultural sphere. 
Maybe the Roman-catholic church was responsible for a delay in the demo-
cratization of Europe? Does the potenial for an ethno-linguistic mobilization 
create problem for a democratic development? Is it the case that the family 
structures that seems to be most compatible with a capitalist development also 
stimulates democratic development? The correlation matrix in Table 6.2 sug-
gests a crude answer to these questions. lt is a striking fact that only one of the 
cultural variables show any strong relationship with the dependent variables, 
and it is the family structure variable (TODD). The strength of the Roman-
catholic church (RC) as it is measured by estimates of its size from circa 1900 
do not go together with any of the phases of democratic development. The 
potential for ethno-linguistic mobilization (measured by various indicators of 
ethnic fragmentation) (ELF, ELN, DOMI; DOM2) covaries weakly negative 
with legitimacy, and this is the only stable relationship to report. 
Turning to the economic variables they capture on the one hand the timing 
of the capitalist breakthrough in Europe (the Rokkan model) and on the 
other hand the strength of the agrarian elite in the 19th century (the Moore 
model). As a proxy for the capitalist breakthrough data about the 
GNP/capita around 1830 (Bairoch 1982) has formed the Basis for classifying 
countries as belonging to an earlier period or a later period (GNP). The 
strength of the agrarian elite is measured by two measures: (AG 1) the e-
xistence or non-existence of a large agraraian elite as suggested by Ste-
phens (1989: 234) and (AG2) the existence or non-existence of large lan-
downers as presented by Urwin (1980: 123). As is evident from the correla-
tion matrix in Table 6.3 there are some instances of a 
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Table 6.1: 
Correlation matrix: democratic development and the territorial dimension 
 Democratic development     
Terr. LEG LEG SUFF SUFF FR PROP PARL
dimen. 1 11 M F 1900 REP  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CPR -.77 .77 -.12 .14 .30 .08 -.40 
CORE -.88 .84 -.09 -.07 .24 -.14 -.69 
WEST -.80 .80 -.02 -.14 .35 .09 -.36 
 (N=28) (N=28) (N=28) (N=28) (N=28
)
(N=27
)
(N=26)
Notes: 
(1) and (2) sec table 5.1.3; (3), (4) and (5) sec table 5.2; (6) sec table 5.3, 
(7) sec table 5.4; CPR, CORE and WEST are explained in Appendix 1. 
 
 
Table 6.2: 
Correlation matrix: democratic development and the cultural dimension 
 Democratic development     
Cult. 
dimen. 
LEG 
1 
(1) 
LEG 
11 
(2) 
SUFF 
M 
(3) 
SUFF 
F 
(4) 
FR 
190
0 
(5) 
PROP 
REP 
(6) 
PARL
(7) 
RC 1 -.25 .20 .07 .19 .04 .22 .02 
RC2 -.21 .16 .10 .21 .00 .23 .02 
ELF .33 -.29 -.11 .01 -.09 -.04 .23 
ELN .23 -.22 -.05 -.03 -.09 -.06 .18 
DOM I -.22 .19 .11 -.03 .04 .07 -.14 
DOM2 -.29 .27 .03 -.08 .12 .20 -.18 
TODD -.82 .71 -.08 -.O1 .24 .03 -.55 
 (N=28) (N=28) (N=28) (N=28) (N=28) (N=27) (N=26) 
 
Notes: 
(1) and (2) sec table 5.1.3; (3), (4) and (5) sec table 5.2; (6) sec table 5.3;  
(7) sec table 5.4, RC1, RC2, ELF, ELN DOM1, DOM2 and TODD are 
explained in Appendix 1. 
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Table 6.3: 
Correlation matrix: democratic development and the economic dimension 
Democratic development 
Econ. 
dimen. 
LEG 
I 
(1) 
LEG 
II 
(2) 
SUFF 
M 
(3) 
SUFF 
F 
(4) 
FR 
1900 
(5) 
PROP 
REP 
(6) 
PARL
(7) 
GNP -.65 .66 -.18 .17 .38 .16 -.47 
AG1 .40 -.44 .19 .06 -.35 .07 .24 
AG2 .44 -.30 .32 -.l3 -.26 .17 .41 
     (N=28) (N=28) (N=28) (N=28) (N=28) (N=27) (N=26) 
 
Notes: 
(1) and (2) sec table 5.1.3; (3), (4) and (5) sec table 5.2; (6) sec table 5.3; 
(7) sec table 5.4; GNP, AG 1 and AG2 are explained in Appendix 1. 
 
 
Table 6.4: 
Correlation matrix: democratic development and the political dimension 
Democratic development 
Polit. 
dimen. 
LEG 
1 
(1) 
LEG 
II 
(2) 
SUFF 
M 
(3) 
SUFF 
F 
(4) 
FR 
1900 
(5) 
PROP 
REP 
(6) 
PARL
(7) 
CONST -.47 .51 .10 -.06 .25 -.13 -.33 
MILIT .16 -.22 -.09 -.27 -.24 .17 .27 
ELITE -.73 .74 -.15 -.13 .35 -.21 -.55 
    (N=28) (N=28) (N=28) (N=28) (N=28) (N=27) (N=26) 
 
 
Notes: 
(1) and (2) sec table 5.1.3, (3), (4) and (5) sec table 5.2; (6) sec table 5.3; 
(7) sec table 5.4; CONST, MILIT and ELITE are explained in Appendix 1. 
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covariation. An early capitalist breakthrough and a weck agrarian elite tends to 
go together with an early passing of the legitimacy threshold. Otherwise these 
two sets of explanatory variables shows the expected signs, but the strength of 
the relationships are generally low. What has been called the political variables 
represents the final set of the explanatory variables. It is meaningful to call 
them political since they may be considered to be the consequences of actions 
taken by political authorities. The First one (CONST) is an indicator that tries 
to capture the survival of representative institutions from the Middle Ages to 
the 19th century. This means that it considers the existence of early parliamen-
tarian estates (Myers 1975) as well as the possibilities for the absolutist regimes 
to break such traditions (Miller 1990); the higher the value, the more of sur-
vival. The second variable (MILIT) catches the involvement in wars and the 
resulting internal resource mobilisation in the 17th century as suggested by 
Downing (1992). The final variable an elite settlement (ELITE) is inspired by 
Higley and Burton (1989; 1992) and tries to classify political systems wich 
respect to the establishment of a consensual political culture as it is manifested 
by elite settlements. This classification may be open for argument, but here it is 
suggested that we distinguish between an early settlement, a late settlement (i.e. 
there was a potential for an earlier settlement), and no settlement. Table 6.4 
contains the relevant correlation matrix. The pattern is similar to the one in the 
previous table. The legitimacy threshold and the introduction of parliamentary 
regime covaries with CONST and ELITE, and these variables do also show the 
expected sign when considering the extension of franchise around 1900. The 
military involvement variable (MILIT) shows no strong covariation with the 
dependent variables, although such a tradition of military involvement may 
hamper the introduction of legitimate rule and the extension of the franchise. 
The dependent variables consists of the four thresholds of democratic devel-
opment. Among them it is only the earliest one, legitimacy, that shows a co-
variation wich the explanatory variables. And Among the four sets of inde-
pendent variables territory and culture seem to have a greater impact an the 
dependent variables than economy and politics. 
Let us now take a more systematic look upon how well different models ex-
plain the variation in democratic development. In order to make such an 
evaluation a series of regression equations have been estimated. In a Frst step 
the different dependent variables has been regressed against four different 
blocks of independent variables, each block representing a territorial model, a 
cultural model, an economic model and a political model. If one compares the 
relative impact each block has an the dependent variables one may get a rough 
picture about which models that matter as well as therr relative importance 
when compared with other models. This impact is measured with the adjusted 
R square, which takes into consideration the different numbers of independent 
variables used. Table 6.5 contains an overview of these estimations. The same 
findings emerge as from the correlation analyses. These models are relevant to 
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Table 6.5: 
Regression analyses: the outcome of block regressions an the variables measur-
ing democratic development: R2A 
 Democratic development     
Bloc LEG LEG SUFF SUFF FR PROP PARL
regr. 1 11 M F 1900 REP  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Territ. .84 .79 .00 .08 .01 .00 .44 
Cultural .86 .67 .07 :00 .02 .13 .14 
Economic .45 .48 .05 .00 .12 .00 .20 
Political .49 .52 .00 .03 .03 .00 .21 
 (N=28) (N=28) (N=28) (N=28) (N=28) (N=27) (N=26) 
 
Notes: 
(1) and (2) sec table 5.1.3; (3), (4) and (5) sec table 5.2, (6) sec table 5.3;  
(7) sec fable 5.4; the block dimensions are explained in Appendix 1. 
 
 
Table 6.6: 
Regression analyses: the outcome of residual analyses. 
Democratic development 
 LEG LEG SUFF SUFF FR PROP PARL
 1 11 M F 1900 REP  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
R2A Re        
siduals: .88 .78 .02 .03 .14 .12 .48 
West 5 12 6 6 5 5 6 
East 4 2 4 4 5 4 3 
 (N=28) (N=28) (N=28) (N=28) (N=28) (N=27) (N=26) 
Notes: 
(1) and (2) sec table 5.1.3; (3), (4) and (5) sec table 5.2; (6) sec table 5.3, 
(7) sec table 5.4; the block dimensions are explained in Appendix 1. 
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the understanding of the country variation in the passing of the thresholds of 
legitimacy and the introduction of parliamentary systems. The variation in the 
introduction of the other thresholds is more difficult to account for. The models 
that matter seem in the Frst instance to be territory and culture, but economy 
and politics also have an impact. 
Looking further into these models it is possible to discern the impact of 
various factors, viz. those of a Rokkanian origin versus other factors. Within 
the territorial factor-block it is evident that LORE shows the strongest impact, 
while TODD palys die same role among the cultural variables. The other vari-
ables that has an impact are GNP (economic bloc) and ELITE (political bloc). 
This means that the impact of the Rokkan model (CORE, GNP) is as relevant 
as the impact of other models (TODD, ELITE). 
Another Einding from the testing of the models is that it is possible to esti-
mate models that can explain the variation in the timing of the legitimacy 
threshold, while explaining the variation in the other thresholds meets with 
problems. What seems to matter most with regard to the introduction of the 
legitimacy threshold is territory and culture. The geopolitical position within 
the core of Europe and a cultural environment that encouraged the development 
of a capitalist ethic (freedom and inequality) was conducive to an early intro-
duction of the virtues of a civil society, i.e. the legitimation threshold. This is 
evident from the regression equations estimated below. The First one (EQ 1) 
portrays this relationship, while the second one (EQ 2) indicates that there 
probably is an interaction effect for territory and culture (CORE and TODD). 
The simultaneous effect of territory and culture did apparently further stimulate 
an earlier rise of the legitimate state. 
EQ 1: LEG 1 = 9.4    - 2.7*CORE - 2.0*TODD            AdjRSq = .85 
T-stat  25.4   -5.9     -4.0 
EQ 2: LEG1 =  9.9   - 4.3*CORE - 2.9*TODD + 1.5*CORE*TOD   AdjRSq = .89 
T stat  27.7 -6.8     -5.6      3.2 
The relevance of these models may be further enlightened by looking at the 
cases that fit the general pattern and those cases that deviate. For each of the 
five dependent variables constituting the block of democratic development, 
regression equations have been estimated that include variables from the mod-
els discussed above. The purpose of these regressions is to analyse the residuals 
estimated in order to Emd out if the cases that deviates mostly may be found in 
eastern or in western Europe; western Europe here refers to the set of nations 
most often studied by Rokkan (17 western and 11 eastern). In Table 6.6 the 
outcome of these analyses is presented. In general there is no clearcut pattern 
when looking at the deviating cases. Mostly there are as many eastern cases as 
could be expected. There is, however, one exception and it concerns one of the 
legitimacy variables (LEG2) where almost all deviating cases are to be found in 
the western part of Europe. It may be interpreted as that the model 
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in question somewhat better catches the variation in the introduction of legiti-
macy in eastern Europe. The general conclusion to be drawn is thus that the 
models used for explaining the variation in European democratic development 
is as releveant for eastern Europe as it is for western Europe. 
7. Conclusion 
There is indeed a variation in the timing of the rise of democracy in Europe. In 
general it follows the pattern suggested by Rokkan, meaning that the threshold 
of legitimacy is passed first, to be followed by the thresholds of incorporation, 
representation and execution of power. Among them only the timing of the 
legitimacy threshold seems to be possible to account for fully with respect to 
the models tested here. The reason for this may be either that the models tested 
are inadequate or that the legitimacy threshold is quite distinct and differs from 
the other thresholds. 
Let us first look at the models tested. In terms of the Rokkan models, terri-
tory as well as culture are important components. This is only true to a lesser 
extent of economy, in the present configuration, and politics. In revisiting Rok-
kan's models for all over Europe, the Endings may be looked upon as indicating 
the general relevance of his models, but it is meaningful to incorporate some 
other factors not addressed by Rokkan, such as family structures (TODD) or 
elite settlements (ELITE). They furthermore appears to be relevant for the 
western as well as the eastern part of Europe. It is, however, also necessary to 
stress that the causal impact of these structural factors is not a general one, and 
that they may be overcome by political actions taken by a political leadership. 
These factors have obviously been insufficiently covered by the models tested. 
The introduction of legitimacy rule in a political system says something de-
cisive about the prospects for establishing a democratic polity. The introduction 
of universal suffrage, however, is only a necessary condition for a democratic 
regime, but not a sufficient condition. This means that the timing of the intro-
duction of universal suffrage may be dependent upon many short-term factors. 
And consequently it might be difficult to account for the timing of this thresh-
old. 
An early introduction of democracy does not mean the establishment of a 
stable democracy. Other mechanisms are operating when it comes to the stabil-
ity of democracy, although an early rise of democracy might be conducive for 
its stability. The longer period a political system has been exposed to a political 
culture engrained by liberal values, the better the prospects for forming a stable 
democracy would be. In this respect, the Eindings in this analysis regarding 
factors that have an impact an the introduction of the legitimacy threshold, are 
relevant for an understanding of the stability of democracy in Europe.  
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Notes:  
1) represents the country codes explained in Appendix 2 
2) CPR = centre-periphery score; 1= centre; 0 = periphery (Rokkan 1970) 
3) CORE = centre-periphery score; 2 = centre; l= semi-periphery; 0 = pe-
riphery (Janos 1989) 
4) WEST = west-east location; 2 = west; 1 = central Europe; 0 = east 
5) RC1 =percentage roman catholics approx 1900 (Barrett 1982) 
6) RC2 = percentage roman catholics approx 1900 (Shoup 1981) 
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7) ELF = ethno-linguistic fragmentation; fragmentation index (Tesniere 
1928) 
8) ELN = ethno-linguistic fragmentation, effective numbers (Tesniere 
1928) 
9) DOM I = percentage of population that belongs to the dominant lan-
guage group (Tesniere 1928) 
10) DOM2 = percentage of population that belongs to the dominant lan-
guage group (Winkler 1930) 
11) TODD = family structure, 2 = liberty & inequality; 1 = liberty or ine-
quality; 0 = authoritarian and equal 
12) GNP = approx. time for capitalist breakthrough; 1 = early break-
through; 0 = late breakthrough; cf Bairoch 1982  
13) AG1 = strength of an agrarian elite; 1 = strong elite; 
0 = weak elite; cf Stephens 1989 
14) AG2 = existence of large landowners; 1 large landowners;  
0 = small landowners; cf Urwin 1980 
15) CONST = continuity of representative institutions; the higher the value, 
the more of continiuity; cf Myers 1975 
16) MILIT = military war involvement in early modern history, the higher 
the value, the more of war involvement; cf Downing 1992 
17) ELITE = existence of an elite settlement; 2 = an early settlement; 1 = 
late settlement; 0 = no settlement; cf Higley & Burton 1989, Burton et 
al. 1992 
APPENDIX 2: Cases included in the analyses 
Code Nation-state Code Nation-state Code Nation-state 
Alb Albania Gre Greece Por Portugal 
Aus Austria Hun Hungary Rom Romania 
Bel Belgium Ire Ireland Spa Spain 
Bul Bulgaria Ita Italy Swe Sweden 
Cze Czechoslovakia Lat Latvia Swi Switzerland 
Den Denmark Lit Lithuania UK United Kingdom 
Est Estonia Lux Luxembourg Rus Russia/USSR 
Fin Finland Net Netherlands Yug Yugoslavia 
Fra France Nor Norway   
Ger Germany Pol Poland   
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